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INTRODUCTION
Judges, whether presiding over bench and jury trials as they
do in the United States, or serving as specially-trained careerists
as they do in civil law countries, are at the heart of the factfinding and legal inquiries required of judicial officers. As the
individuals charged with implementing an entire nation's justice
system, judges carry a weighty mantel.
We expect all judges to have certain baseline characteristics,
including competence, independence, and, of particular
significance to this Article, impartiality.' A judge lacking
impartiality taints case outcomes and makes a mockery of socalled "justice."2
Often honored in legal commentary but downplayed in
practice is the importance-indeed, the necessity-that judges
are perceived as being impartial.3 Perceptions ofjustice ultimately
1. See Norman L. Greene, How Great is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An
Inquiry into the Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their
ImplicationsforJudicialElections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112
W. VA. L. REV. 873, 883 (2010) ("Although the issues might differ across countries, the
objectives are similar, including decision-makers who are competent, efficient, and

neutral.
2. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 5.4.1, at 150 (1996) ("Judicial decisions rendered

under circumstances suggesting bias or favoritism tend to breed skepticism, undermine
the integrity of the courts, and generally thwart the principles upon which our
jurisprudential system is based.").
3. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 5.4.1, at 150 ("Since an appearance of bias may be
just as damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice as the actual
presence of bias, acts or conduct giving the appearance of bias should generally be
avoided in the same way as acts or conduct that inexorably bespeak partiality.");
Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: With Great Power Comes Great
Responsibility, 89JUDICATURE 35, 35 (2005) ("To hold judges to the highest standard of

ethical conduct, a code of judicial conduct must cover not just the clear and obvious
improprieties but indirect, disguised, or careless conduct that looks like an impropriety
to an observer who is neither overly suspicious nor unusually gullible."); Nancy J.
Moore, Is the Appearance of Impropriety an AppropriateStandardfor DiscipliningJudgesin the
Twenty-First Century?, 41 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 291 (2010) [hereinafter Moore,
Appearance of Impropriety] ("Avoiding not only impropriety, but also the appearance of
impropriety, is important for judges because public confidence in the independence,

integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary is critical to the public's willingness to accept
judicial decision-making and submit to the rule of law."); Randall T. Shepard,
Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059,
1067 (1996) ("U]udges must not only be impartial in fact, they must appear to be
impartial."); see also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, COMMENTARY ON THE
BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT 17 (2007) [hereinafter Commentary on the

BangalorePrinciples] ("J]udges must not only meet objective criteria of impartiality but
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determine the judiciary's reputation and success by instilling
public confidence in the courts.4 Regardless of nationality, a
nation's judiciary is measured in terms of its fairness and
impartiality, both actual and perceived.5
We begin this Article with a brief look at the prevailing
international norms for judicial impartiality. We take a close
look at five common law countries and their approaches to the
need for judicial impartiality. We explain that there is an
acknowledged international norm requiring a competent and
impartial judiciary.6 Although this norm is not seriously disputed
anywhere, adherence to the norm frequently falls short

must also be seen to be impartial; what is at stake is the trust that the courts must
inspire in those who are brought before them in a democratic society."). See generally
FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER,JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 1

(2d ed. 2010) ("[P]ublic confidence in the administration ofjustice is indispensable. It
is not enough thatjudges be impartial; the public must perceive them to be so.").
4. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is
confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true
backbone of the rule of law."); JEFFREY M. SHARMAN, AM..JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL
ETHICS: INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY, AND INTEGRITY 13 (1996) ("Hence, judges are
expected to avoid not only actual partiality, but the appearance of it as well, because
the appearance of a judge who is not impartial diminishes public confidence in the
judiciary and degrades the justice system."); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?.
judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 610
(2002) ("That judicial decision-making must appear to be free of bias is premised on
the widely held belief that public confidence is essential to upholding the legitimacy of
the judiciary.") (emphasis added); id. at 611 ("[Tlhe judiciary--especially the
appointed judiciary-derives its authority and legitimacy from the willingness of the
people and sister branches of government to accept and submit to its decisions.
Because public confidence is so essential to maintaining the integrity of the bench,
even the appearance of bias, parochialism, or favoritism can threaten the judicial
function."); Theodor Meron, judicial Independence and Impartiality in the International
Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 369 (2005) ("U]udicial independence ...
depends on public support for the judiciary as an institution, and to earn that support
the judiciary must appear scrupulously impartial in its decision making. Together with
fidelity to the law, impartiality is a means of ensuring the accountability of an
independentjudiciary in a democratic society and in the international community.").
5. See Greene, supra note 1, at 883 ("Although the issues might differ across
countries, the objectives are similar, including decision-makers who are . . . neutral,
neither biased nor appearing to a reasonable observer to be biased.. . .").
6. See R. Matthew Pearson, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance &
Improving Recusal of Supreme Courtjustices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1799, 1814 (2005)
("The expectation of judicial impartiality is a hallmark of most modern legal systems.
In fact, resolution of disputes by an unbiased tribunal has been characterized as a
fundamental human right.").
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everywhere.7 The guiding principles are well-intentioned, but
they fail to more fully address the core concern that justice both
be and appearto be impartial.

After a brief look internationally, we take a pointed, finegrained look directly at the United States itself. With that
background, we conclude that two consistent problems lie in
judicial recusal worldwide-problems concerning both the
process and the substance of determining when a judge should
be disqualified from hearing a particular matter.8 The
substantive problem concerns an undue emphasis on an
objective recusal standard, to the neglect of appearances of
impropriety. The process problem stems from a notion that is
central to the need for impartiality-the fundamental premise
of Anglo-American jurisprudence, and one repeated throughout
the globe-that "no man should be a judge in his own case."9
This ideal, repeated so frequently that it has become a clich,
can be found in the Latin, nemo debet esse iudex in propria causa;

7. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating that in both civil
and criminal proceedings, one is entitled to a hearing before "an independent and
impartial" tribunal); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (Ill)
A, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (determining that everyone has
the right to a fair and impartial tribunal).
8. This Article will use the terms "recusal" and "disqualification" interchangeably.
Traditionally, "recusal" has referred to a judge's discretionary, voluntary decision to
step down. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 4 (noting this traditional view); Karen
Nelson Moore, Appellate Review ofJudicial DisqualificationDecisions in the Federal Courts,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 n.3 (1984) [hereinafter Moore, Appellate Review] (noting that
although the term "recusal" often is used as a synonym for disqualification, "it
technically refers to a voluntary decision of the judge to step down").
"Disqualification," in contrast, refers to a motion for the statutorily or constitutionally
mandated removal of ajudge. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 4-5. Despite the technical
distinction between "recusal" and "disqualification," they are often treated as
synonyms. In manyjurisdictions the term "disqualification" has been defined in such a
way as to include both removal by a judge on his own motion and removal at the
request of a party. In fact, in modem practice the terms "disqualification" and
"recusal" are frequently viewed as synonymous and are often used interchangeably. Id
§ 1.1, at 5.
9. See Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.), 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 1 18a; see also
John P. Frank, Disqualificationoffudges: In Support of the Bayh Bill 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 43, 45 (1970) (citing I EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 141a for the axiom that
"[n]o man shall be judge in his own case.").
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in the United States, it is found in The Federalist Papers'0 and
more recently in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.," which we
discuss below. Yet almost universally, judges are the first and
often the last evaluators of their own bias and impartiality-it is
the challenged judge who rules on her own impartiality. This
process issue is joined by a troubling dilemma that is not
confined to law-the difficulty that human actors have in
judging their own conduct when challenged by parties whose
sensibilities differ from their own.' 2
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE
"We are all inclined tojudge ourselves by our ideals;
others, by their acts. "- Sir Harold George Nicholson"

The distance between ideals and reality is found
throughout all human endeavors, including within the world of
law. One of the many places in which this dichotomy plays out is
within the judiciary, in the requirement that judges decide cases
impartially and without bias. The "first world" of international
law-its official organs, the United Nations and the leading
Non-governmental Organizations ("NGO")-endorses strong
statements about the need for impartial and unbiased judging. 4
Yet nowhere (and this includes the United States) is the ideal of
a fair and impartial judge fully and effectively honored.

10. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("No man is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly
bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.").
11. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).
12. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921)

("We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see
them with any eyes except our own.").
13. Sir Harold George Nicholson was an English diplomat and author. JOHN
RAYMOND COOK, ASPHALT JUSTICE: A CRITIQUE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
AMERICA 117 (2000); HIGH IMPACr QUOTATIONS 4 (Richard Pound ed., 2004); WISDOM
OF THE ELDERS: THE ULTIMATE QUOTE BOOK FOR LIFE 70 (Bohdi Sanders ed., 2011).

14. See Greene, supra note 1, at 883-84 ("International and domestic principles of
the rule of law, including the internationally respected model The Bangalore Principles
ofJudicial Conduct, require that judges be impartial. To the same effect are the United
Nations Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, noting that judges shall
decide 'impartially

reason.'").

. . .

without any improper influences, inducements .

.

. for any
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Two reasons underlie this failure. First, the consistent
judicial disqualification procedure employed in common law
countries, whereby the challenged judge is the sole evaluator of
the disqualification motion, undermines the judiciary's ability to
achieve genuine impartiality. Second, as a matter of substance,
too little attention is paid to the need to satisfy the appearance of
impartiality in all of the legal systems that we will examine in
connection with this Article. Judges should act without actual
bias and without the appearance of bias-a concept recognized
long ago in the Roman Code ofJustinian.' 5 The central question
for this inquiry is how to determine the absence of bias as an
objective matter. The test is not whether the judge considers
herself biased. However, the so-called objective test collapses the
standard into the judge's judgment even when the objective is to
determine the appearance of bias.
A. InternationalModels
The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights

has declared since 1948 that "[e]veryone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal."' 6 In 1966, the United Nations adopted the
InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral

treaty that proclaims: "In the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by
law."l 7
In 2000, under the auspices of the United Nations' Global
Programme Against Corruption, chief justices from eight

15. CODEJUST. 3.1.16 Uustinian 531) ("Although ajudge has been appointed by
imperial power yet because it is our pleasure that all litigations should proceed without
suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks the judge under suspicion to recuse

him before [an] issue joined, so that the cause go to another . . . .), translated in
Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1948).
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
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countries formed the Judicial Integrity Group.18 The Judicial
Integrity Group subsequently drafted the Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct,'9 which were adopted by the Round Table
Meeting of Chief Justices at The Hague in 2002. The Bangalore
Principles are internationally respected and recognized as
providing essential elements of the rule of law and the need for
impartial and uncorrupted judges.o By their own declaration,
the Bangalore Principles "are intended to establish standards for
the ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide
guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for
regulating judicial conduct."2'
The Bangalore Principles expressly address the need for
judicial impartiality, stating that as a general principle:
"Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
18. See JUDICIAL INTEGRITY GRP., History of the Group 2000-2011,
00
-201 I.pdf
http://www.judicialintegritygroup.org/resources/documents/JIG%2020
(last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
19. See JUD. INTEGRITY GRP., Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
www.judicialintegritygroup.org/resources/documents/ECOSOC_2006_235_Engl.pdf
[hereinafter BangalorePrinciples] (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
20. See Greene, supra note 1, at 883 (stating that the Bangalore Principles are an
"internationally respected model"); see also Commentary on the Bangalore Principles,supra
note 3, at 5 ("The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct have increasingly been
accepted by the different sectors of the global judiciary and by international agencies
interested in the integrity of the judicial process. In the result, the Bangalore Principles
are seen more and more as a document that all judiciaries and legal systems can accept
unreservedly. In short, these principles give expression to the highest traditions
relating to the judicial function as visualized in all cultures and legal systems.").
21. Bangalore Principles, supra note 19. The Bangalore Principles are intended to
establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide
guidance to judges and to offer the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial
conduct. Six core values are recognized: independence, impartiality, integrity,
propriety, equality, and finally competence and diligence. The Principles define their
meaning and elaborate in detail on what kind of conduct is to be expected in concrete
terms of the persons concerned in order to put the respective value into practice. A
number of specific instructions are given under each of the values. Not only have some
states adopted the Bangalore Principles but others have modelled their own principles
ofjudicial conduct on them. International organizations have also looked at them with
favor and given them their endorsement. The United Nations Social and Economic
Council, by resolution 2006/23, has invited member states consistent with their
domestic legal systems to encourage their judiciaries to take into consideration the
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct when reviewing or developing rules with
respect to the professional and ethical conduct of the members of the judiciary. The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has actively supported it and it has also
received recognition from bodies such as the American Bar Association and the
International Commission ofJurists. The judges of the member states of the Council of
Europe have also given it their favourable consideration. Id.
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office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made."22 They continue: "A
judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favour,
bias or prejudice"23 and "shall ensure that his or her conduct
.. . maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and
of the judiciary."2 4 As a result, "[a] judge shall disqualify himself
or herself from participating in any proceedings in which the
judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it
may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to
decide the matter impartially . . . . "2
Although these are laudable aspirations, there are at least
two fundamental issues here. One is integral to the principle
22. Id. 12 (impartiality).
23. Id. 2.1.
24. Id 2.2.
25. Id. 2.5. In full, the provisions concerning impartiality within the Bangalore
Principles state:
Principle
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Application
2.1. A judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favour, bias or
prejudice.
2.2. A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants
in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
2.3. A judge shall, as far as is reasonable, so conduct himself or herself as to
minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for the judge to be disqualified
from hearing or deciding cases.
2.4. A judge shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come
before, the judge, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process, nor shall
the judge make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of
any person or issue.
2.5. A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any
proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it
may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter
impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter
in controversy; or
(c) The judge, or a member of the judge's family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy; provided that disqualification of a judge shall
not be required if no other tribunal can be constituted to deal with the case or, because
of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage ofjustice. Id.
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itself; the other is a matter of process. The integral issue
concerns linking the perception of bias in the "reasonable
observer" standard. What does this mean in practice? The
standard, it is frequently said, is designed to protect against
excessive disqualifications by devaluing any purely subjective
fear of bias by the litigating parties. 26 Although we are not aware
of any crisis anywhere that has created excessive judicial
disqualifications, we do accept the need for an objective
standard.
However, experience with the recusal standard in common
law countries shows that this test of impartiality, stated so
carefully as an "objective" standard, is linked to the community
being judged: the perspective of a "reasonable observer" is seen
through the prism of the judiciary making the judgment. This
issue links directly to the second procedural issue: it is the
challenged judge herself who decides whether she should be
disqualified.27 Both issues are corollaries of the maxim that no
man should be ajudge in his own case.28
B. judicialRecusal in Canada,the United Kingdom, Australia,and
South Africa
R. Matthew Pearson's 2005 research found surprising
uniformity at the highest court level in both the standards and
processes for recusal requests in Canada, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and South Africa.29 Not only does the challenged
judge review the petitioner's request that the judge disqualify
herself, but the standard applied is one that asks the challenger
to stand in the shoes of the judge being challenged. This is in
contrast to asking the judge to consider the matter from the
point of view of the challenger. This undermines the
appearance of impropriety standard and the need for public
confidence in the judiciary.
In Canada, the standard for judicial recusal is
"apprehension of bias [that] must be a reasonable one, held by
26. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 6, at 1812-13.
27. See id. at 1815, 1820, 1824, 1827 (reporting that in the United States, England,
Canada, Australia, and South Africa, the challenged judge rules on the disqualification
motion).
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Pearson, supra note 6.
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reasonable and rightminded persons."30 There, the reasonable
person is "an informed and right-minded member of the
community"3 ' who approaches the question of bias with a
"complex and contextualized understanding of the issues of the
case."32 Canada appears to have translated the determination of
possible bias into a subjectivized standard-from the viewpoint
of informed members of the judicial branch. It is not enough
that the challenger is convinced in a way that is reasonable from
her perspective that there is the possibility of bias. Instead, the
apprehension of bias must be based on a thorough knowledge
of the facts and circumstances and result from a careful
consideration of those facts in light of the dispute.
The United Kingdom has a similar approach. It initially
considered using a "reasonable suspicion" test, but rejected it in
favor of a test that considers a "real danger of Uudicial] bias."33
Ten years later, the House of Lords revised the original test.M
The new test emphasizes the importance of an objective
assessment based on the person who "adopts a balanced
approach" to the issue of bias.35
Australia, too, has a similar approach. Australia emphasizes
the importance of public perception in recusal determinations3b
and rejects the English approach as attributing to the general
public too much knowledge of the law and faith in the judicial
process.37 However, Australia still requires that the greater
emphasis be placed on the perception of the hypothetical
reasonable person over the apprehension of bias as perceived by
the parties."
30. Comm. for Justice & Liberty v. Nat'I Energy Bd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 394
(Can.) (de Grandpre,J., dissenting). This test initially appeared in a dissenting opinion
but is now the accepted test. See R.D.S. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 94 (Can.)
(Cory & lacobucci,J., concurring).
31. R.D.S. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 1 46 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dube &
McLachlin,JJ., concurring).
32. Id. 48.
33. SeeThe Queen v. Gough, [1993] A.C. 646,660 (U.K).
34. See Porter v. Magill, [2002] 2 A.C. 357, 494 (U.K.).
35. Lawal v. N. Spirit Ltd., [2004] 1 All E.R. 187, 193 (U.K).
36. See Livesey v. New S. Wales Bar Association., [1983] 151 C.L.R. 288, 293-94
(U.K.).
37. See Webb v. The Queen, [1994] 181 C.L.R. 41, 1 18 (Austl.).
38. See id. 1 2 (Austl.). See generally ENID CAMPBELL & H.P. LEE, THE AUSTRALIAN
JUDICIARY 134 (2001) (discussing Australia's reasonable apprehension of bias recusal
standard).
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South Africa presents something of an alternative.-9 Its
Constitutional Court selected the "reasonable suspicion" test
over the "real likelihood" test.40 However, the analysis still
begins with the presumption that judges will approach
controversies impartially,4 ' and the inquiry "is whether a
reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct
facts reasonably apprehend that the judge . . . will not bring an
impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case." 42 In
addition, "[t]he reasonableness of the apprehension must be
assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to
administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to
carry out that oath by reason of their training and experience." 43
It must be assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any
irrelevant beliefs or predispositions." Accordingly, South
Africa's approach is indeed different by virtue of selecting the
"reasonable suspicion" test. However, its insistence that the
observer knows the "correct facts" and its further insistence on a
presumption of judicial impartiality render the standard less
consonant with giving more weight to appearances than it might
initially appear.
Thus, in each of these common law systems, the challenged
judge assesses her own impartiality using an "objective test." But,
the test assesses bias from the judge's point of view, rather than
considering the appearance of impropriety or giving any
substantial weight to litigants' apprehensions. With this
international background, we now turn to these same recusal
issues in the United States.

39. See generally JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS
NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA (2001) (discussing the

African courts).
40. See President of the Republic of S. Mr. v. S. Mr. Rugby Football Union, 1999
(7) BCLR 725 (CC) para. 36 (S. Mr.).
41. Id. 40.
42. Id. 48.
43. Id
44. Id
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II. THE UNITED STATES
There is remarkably little difference between US recusal
norms and those in other countries.45 In the United States, the
responsibility of ensuring a fair trial lies squarely with the judge
due to the adversarial nature of litigation within the US legal
system. In Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co.,4 6 the US Supreme
Court examined the ultimate line in the sand-the line that,
when crossed, constitutes a deprivation of constitutional due
process. In a five to four decision, the Caperton Court held that
the judge's refusal to recuse himself amounted to a deprivation
of the litigant's constitutional due process rights. Though
decided on due process grounds, Caperton presents a helpful
context for examining recusal-based issues because it provides a
vivid illustration of the perils associated with both directing
recusal motions to the challenged judge, as well as the inability
(or refusal) of some judges to consider the appearance of
impropriety as required by the recusal standard.
A. The Caperton Case
Hugh Caperton and several related businesses (collectively,
"Caperton") sued A.T. Massey Coal Company and its affiliates
(collectively, "Massey") in a West Virginia state court, alleging
that Massey's activities destroyed Caperton's business. 4 7 The jury
awarded Caperton US$50 million in compensatory and punitive
damages.48
After the verdict's entry, but before Massey's appeal, West
Virginia conducted its judicial elections. One of the positions
subject to this election was a state supreme court position in
which attorney Brent Benjamin challenged the incumbent
justice.49 Don Blankenship, Massey's chairman, president, and
chief executive officer contributed heavily to Benjamin's

45. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 1827 ("[Rjecusal policy . . . has developed
similarly in many countries . . . [, and] it is clear that certain common principles are
found in the way most modern common law systems address disqualification of
judges.").
46. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
47. 1&at 872.
48. 1&
49. M at 873.
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campaign-and Benjamin won." Blankenship's campaign
contributions were extraordinary, exceeding "the total amount
spent by all other Benjamin supporters,"5 ' amounting to "three
times the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee,"52 and
"[US]$1 million more than the total amount spent by the
campaign committees of both candidates combined." 5 After the
election, Caperton moved to disqualify the newly-installed
Justice from participating in the Capertonappeal on the basis of
Blankenship's contributions to Justice Benjamin's campaign.
Justice Benjamin denied the motion,54 and in a three to two
decision with Justice Benjamin in the majority, the state
Supreme Court reversed the US$50 million verdict against
Massey."5 Caperton sought rehearing and again sought Justice
Benjamin's disqualification. 6 Justice Benjamin again refused to
recuse himself.57
The state Supreme Court granted Caperton's motion for
rehearing, and Caperton filed a third motion seeking to
disqualify Justice Benjamin, which Justice Benjamin denied. 8
On rehearing, the state Supreme Court again held for Massey,
reversing the US$50 million verdict by a 3-2 vote with Justice
Benjamin in the majority.59 After granting certiorari, the US
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, relied on the Constitution's
Due Process Clause in holding that recusal was required.
Repeatedly emphasizing that the facts of the case were
extreme,so the Court concluded that "Blankenship's campaign
efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing Justice Benjamin on the case," 6 1 that "Blankenship's
50. Md
51. 1M (emphasis added).
52. Id (emphasis added).
53. 1M (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 873-74.
55. M at 874.
56. Id
57. M at 875.
58. idt
59. Id.
60. Id. at 886-87 ("On these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to an
unconstitutional level."); see id. at 884 (noting that "this is an exceptional case"); id. at
887 ("Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation.. . ."); id ("The facts
now before us are extreme by any measure.").
61. Id. at 884.
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extraordinary contributions were made at a time when he had a
vested stake in the outcome,"62 and that accordingly, "there was
here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice
Benjamin's recusal." 63 The Supreme Court noted that the
constitutional due process standard forming the basis for the
Caperton decision would arise only in "rare instances" due to the
greater protections afforded by the state codes of judicial
conduct. 64 Accordingly, the vast majority of disqualification
motions are not grounded on deprivations of due process.
Instead, most judicial disqualification motions are based on state
codes of judicial conduct or statutes based on the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires recusal when necessary to avoid an "appearance of
impropriety" or when the jurist's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.65
B. Caperton's Illustrative Utility
The Capertondecision aptly illustrates both of the previously
identified recusal issues central to this Article. The applicable
recusal standard under West Virginia law, where Caperton's
events occurred, is "whether 'a reasonable and prudent person,
knowing [the] objective facts, would harbor doubts about [the
judge's] ability to be fair and impartial."' However, Justice
Benjamin repeatedly declined to recuse himself under this
standard, stating that he had "no 'direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest' in [the] case."67 Justice Benjamin also opined
that employing "a standard merly of 'appearances' . . . seems

little more than an invitation to subject West Virginia's justice
system to the vagaries of the day-a framework in which
predictability and stability yield to supposition, innuendo, halftruths, and partisan manipulations."68 Indeed, a recurring
theme throughout Justice Benjamin's opinion defending his
62. Id at 886.
63. Id
64. Id at 889-90.
65. ABA MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUcr pmbl. (2012); id R. 1.2 cmt. 3; id. R.
2.11.

66. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 876 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 223 W. Va. 698 (2008)
(Benjaminj, concurring), rev'd, Caperton,556 U.S. 868 (2009)).
68. Id (quoting Caperton, 223 W. Va. at 707).
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participation in the Caperton case is the rejection of any
consideration of "appearances" of impropriety, and instead, an
insistence that only "actualities" matter.69 Accordingly, Justice
Benjamin's opinion is an example of substituting an "actual
bias" standard for the one required by law.
Thus, we return to two potential sources of difficulty: one
procedural and one substantive. The procedural issue arises
from the practice of directing the recusal motion to precisely
the one judge who is alleged to lack impartiality. The substantive
issue arises from the judge's implementation of the recusal
standard; in particular, the problem that judges may focus on
their subjective belief in their own impartiality, rather than
focusing on how the situation may appear to others, as required
by the recusal standard.
III. WORLDWIDE CONSISTENCY, WORLDWIDE
SHORTCOMINGS
The judicial disqualification approach in common law
countries memorializes consistent and inherent flaws. As we
have identified, those flaws concern both the decision maker
and the standard that the decision maker employs in
determining whether recusal is required.

69. See, e.g., Caperton, 223 W. Va. at 686 (Benjamin, J., concurring) ("If the
touchstone of a judicial system's fairness is actualjustice, which I believe it is, its
legitimacy is measured in actualities, not in the manipulation of appearances. . . ."); id.
at 687 n.2 ("The notion of. . . 'appearance-driven' justice in West Virginia conveys the
message that appearances and rhetoric-particularly when contrived-mean more
than actualities."); id. at 693-94 ("[N]either the Dissenting opinion nor the Appellees
herein point to any actual conduct or activity on my part which could be termed
'improper.' Rather both the Dissenting opinion and the Appellees focus on
appearances."); id. at 693 n.12 ("The very notion of appearance-driven disqualifying
conflicts, with shifting definitional standards subject to the whims, caprices and
manipulations of those more interested in outcomes than in the application of law, is
antithetical to due process."); id. at 694-95 ("The fundamental question raised by the
Appellees and the Dissenting opinion herein is whether, in a free society, we should
value 'apparent or political justice' more than 'actual justice.'"); id. at 707 (Benjamin,
J., concurring) ("The determination of the composition of an appellate court panel by
a standard merely of 'appearances' seems little more than an invitation to subject West
Virginia's justice system to the vagaries of the day-a framework in which predictability
and stability yield to supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations.").
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A. Presentingthe Recusal Motion to the ChallengedJudge
As we saw in Caperton,judicial disqualification motions in
the United States-as in other common law countries-are
directed to, and ruled upon by, the very judge whose impartiality
is questioned.71 In effect, the subject of the disqualification
motion is thus serving as the judge of her own case.7 ' In
Caperton, Justice Benjamin ruled on the recusal motions that
challenged his impartiality and sought his disqualification. The
practice of filing disqualification motions with the challenged
judge implicates at least three issues: (1) the difficulty of
appellate review, (2) potential issues of retribution or
retaliation, and (3) intentional or unintentional self-deception
in assessing one's actual, or the perceived, ability to be impartial.
1. Appellate Review
If a trial judge denies a recusal motion, the moving party
may eventually seek appellate review, but because the ruling is
not a final judgment, immediate appellate review typically is not
available unless the party seeks a writ of mandamus.72 Even once
70. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873-75 (explaining that Caperton unsuccessfully
moved three times to disqualify Justice Benjamin); see also United States v. Morris, 988
F.2d 1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that it is the challenged judge who rules on a
disqualification motion); Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented
Approach to judicialRecusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 531, 536 (2005) (noting that the recusal
decision "is almost always made in the first instance by the very judge being asked to
disqualify himself"); John Leubsdorf, Theories ofJudging and judge Disqualqfication,62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 242 (1987) (noting the "bizarre rule" requiring "the very judge
whose acts are alleged to be warped by unconscious bias to decide whether there is an
adequate showing of bias"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53
BROOK. L. REv. 589, 633 (1987) [hereinafter Stempel, Recusal] (noting that "the
recusal motion is ruled upon by the district judge whose ability to decide fairly is the
very subject of the motion").
71. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see alsoIn re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955) (stating that "no man can be a judge in his own case"); judicial
Disqualfication: Hearing on S.1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973) (statement
of Sen. Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Surely litigants who believe that
they cannot get a fair trial before a particular judge should not have to convince the
very same judge of his bias.").
72. See Stempel, Recusal, supra note 70, at 634 ("The denial of a disqualification
motion is never a final order subjecting the case to immediate appeal since the case
remains to be decided on the merits. Ordinarily, then, the unsuccessful recusal movant
must wait until the conclusion of trial court proceedings and use the judge's recusal
decision as a point for appeal from a loss on the merits.") Such appeals may be
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the matter reaches the appellate court, the appellate court
reviews the disqualification ruling pursuant to the highly
deferential abuse of discretion standard.7 3
When the subject of a judicial disqualification motion is a
federal appellate judge, or a state supreme courtjustice (such as
Justice Benjamin in the Caperton case), appellate review is
theoretically available, but the likelihood of review by the US
Supreme Court is remote.74
At the very highest court level-the supreme court of the
land-the ability to review a recusal decision varies from nation
to nation. In the highest courts of the United Kingdom,
Australia, and South Africa, precedent indicates that a high
court judge's failure to recuse is subject to review.75 In Canada
and the United States, however, there is no procedure for
reviewing a recusal decision involving a judge (or justice) of the
highest court.7 6
2. Potential retaliation
A judge's position combines structural privilege with the
human frailties of anyone accused of bias. With their positions
insulated to some degree from popular influence, judges may be
tempted to retaliate if challenged with disqualification. As one
commentator has observed:

interlocutory, by writ of mandamus, or on direct appeal of a final order. See id. at 636
(noting that "[t]raditionally, the most likely avenue for interlocutory review of recusal
orders has been the writ of mandamus"); Moore, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 830
(discussing circumstances in which interlocutory appeal is appropriate).
73. See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir.
1988) (stating that "[t]he judge presiding over a case is in the best position to
appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a recusal motion"); Chitimacha
Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1164-66 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that
on an appeal of recusal motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455, "we ask only whether
[the districtjudge] has abused [his or her] discretion").
74. See Debra Lyn Bassett, judicialDisquaficationin the FederalAppellate Courts, 87
IOWA L. REv. 1213, 1237 (2002) [hereinafter Bassett, judicial Disqualification] ("If the
motion to disqualify an appellate judge is unsuccessful, there is essentially no further
recourse.... Further review of a recusal decision is discretionary and rarely granted.");
Stempel, Recusal, supra note 70, at 639-40 ("One can argue that the chances of
obtaining Supreme Court review of even the worst district and appellate recusal
decisions are so rare as to amount to no review at all.").
75. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 1828.
76. See id.
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[W]hile not all judges take umbrage at the filing of
disqualification motions, there have been many examples of
cases in which judges who have been accused of possessing a
disqualifying interest or bias have taken such an accusation
both personally and very seriously . . . . It must be
acknowledged . . . that filing a disqualification motion has

the potential to antagonize the challenged judge, either
consciously or subconsciously, with the result that the
moving litigants and their counsel may suffer. 7
Even if the judge does not engage in overtly retaliatory
behavior that affects the outcome of the litigant's case, other
retribution tactics may nevertheless occur. One US judge
recommended criminal charges against lawyers who questioned
his impartiality;78 Justice Benjamin recorded a rebuke of
Caperton's lawyers in his opinion denying their disqualification
motion.79 Finally, even if the challenged judge does not act on
her own, other judges on the court may note the failed
challenge and project the challenge on themselves or voice their
displeasure at the challenge.8 0
3. Potential Self-Deception
A major roadblock in seeking a more effective recusal
process is the human tendency to see oneself as unbiased and
able to disregard any improper influence. Disqualification
motions suggest an actual or perceived lack of impartiality, when
77. Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality,97
IOWA L. REv. 181, 204 (2011) (quoting FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.7, at 18 (footnotes
omitted)); see Charles Gardner Geyh, Why judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30
REv. LITIG. 671, 708 (2011) ("Disqualification rules give litigants a means to challenge
judicial impartiality, which is at the core of the judge's self-definition.").
78. See Debra Cassens Weiss, FederalJudgeRecommends CriminalChargesfor Lagryers
Who Questioned His Impartiality,A.B.A.J.,Jan. 11, 2011.
79. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 223 W. Va. 624, 709 (2008) (Benjamin,
J., concurring) ("I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge my disappointment in the
material omissions from the motions for disqualification filed herein against myself....
The absence of such a critical analysis here, indeed the lack of even an
acknowledgement of the motions' actual weaknesses, is directly relevant to the legal
credibility of the said motions. It is my purpose here to remind counsel appearing
before this Court of their obligations to this Court and this judicial system.").
80. See Alison Frankel, In Stunning Order, 9th Circuit Blasts Recusal Motion in Death
Case, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/
New-York/News/2012/09- September/Instunningorder,_9thCircuit blasts_
recusalmotionindeathcase.
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judges want to believe that they can be fair and objective:
"People believe they are objective, . . . see themselves as more
ethical and fair than others, . . . and experience a "bias blind

spot," the tendency to see bias in others but not in themselves .
. . . These tendencies make it difficult for judges to identify
their own biases." 8 '
One of the recurring problems in judicial disqualification is
that a judge's belief in her own impartiality misses the point.
"[P]ublic confidence in the judiciary does not result from the
judiciary's perception of impartiality; it results from the public's
perception of impartiality. Thus, a judge's belief that she is not
biased is of little consequence to a recusal determination."8 2 The
recusal standard is based on promoting public confidence in the
judiciary and, by its terms, extends to an "appearance" of
impropriety, even in circumstances where there is no actual
impropriety. As a Seventh Circuit decision explained:
Judges asked to recuse themselves hesitate to impugn their
own standards; judges sitting in review of others do not like
to cast aspersions. Yet drawing all inferences favorable to the
honesty and care of the judge whose conduct has been
questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety
standard under § 455(a) into a demand for proof of actual
impropriety. So although the court tries to make an external
reference to the reasonable person, it is essential to hold in
mind that these outside observers are less inclined to credit
judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary
itself will be.83
A jurist's perception of her own impartiality also suffers
from the failure to acknowledge the existence of unconscious
motivations. 4 Human psychology complicates assessments of
impartiality because people are slow to recognize their own

81. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Matthew Taksin, Can judges Determine Their Own
Impartiality?, 41 MONITOR ON PsYcHoLoGY 24,24 (2010). See Donald C. Nugent,Judicial
Bias, 42 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) ("|]udges are typically appalled if their
impartiality is called into question[, . . . believ[ing] themselves to be consistently
objective, impartial and fair.").
82. Bassett,JudicialDisqualification,supra note 74, at 1245-46 (emphasis added).
83. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).
84. See generallyJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignoranceor
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REv. 61 (2000) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases]
(noting thatjudges are susceptible to various biases).
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biases. 8 Psychological studies have repeatedly confirmed that
individuals may harbor unconscious stereotypes, beliefs, biases,
and prejudices.86 In addition, other psychological processes,
such as framing effects and confirmation bias, may impact
decision making.87 The existence of such unconscious
85. See id. at 65-66 (noting that "biases are easier to spot in others than in
oneself"); Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, "Naive Cynicism" in Everyday Theories of
Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALIY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 743, 74&-44 (1999) (noting tendency to see bias in others more readily than
in ourselves).
86. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in
Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181 (1995) (finding
unconscious gender stereotyping in fame judgments, and finding that explicit
expressions of sexism or stereotypes were uncorrelated with the observed unconscious
gender bias; Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in
Stereotype Priming,70 J. PERSONALIlY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1142 (1996) (concluding
that "stereotypes may be automatically activated"); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: TheirAutomatic and Controlled Components, 56J. PERSONALIlY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
5, 5 (1989) (finding that stereotypes are "automatically activated in the presence of a
member (or some symbolic equivalent) of the stereotyped group and that lowprejudice responses require controlled inhibition of the automatically activated
stereotype"); John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice:Automatic and Controlled
Processes, 33J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 512 (1997) (noting that "[a] versive
racism ... has been identified as a modern form of prejudice that characterizes the
racial attitudes of many Whites who endorse egalitarian values, who regard themselves
as nonprejudiced, but who discriminate in subtle, rationalizable ways"); Kerry
Kawakami et al., Racial Prejudice and Stereotype Activation, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 407, 407 (1998) ("[H]igh prejudiced participants endorsed cultural
stereotypes to a greater extent than low prejudiced participants. Furthermore, for high
prejudiced participants, Black category labels facilitated stereotype activation under
automatic and controlled processing conditions."). See also Bassett, Judicial
Disqualification, supra note 74, at 1249-50 nn.179-83 (discussing these and other
psychological studies into unconscious motivations and bias);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski et al.,
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trialjudges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195 (2009)
(discussing unconscious bias). The American Bar Association ("ABA") Section of
Litigation recently created a Task Force on Implicit Bias, which "will partner with the
National Center of State Courts to address implicit bias in the judicial system." See Mark
A. Drummond, ABA Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias, LITIG. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top-stories/0201 11-implicitbias-research.html.
87. See generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
(2000) (discussing psychological processes in the work of judges and lawyers); Chris
Guthrie et al., Inside the judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 784-821 (2001)
(presenting a study of magistrate judges and concluding that judges rely on the same
cognitive decision-making processes as laypersons and other experts, including framing
effects, egocentric biases, anchoring effects, errors caused by the representativeness
heuristic, and hindsight bias, leaving judges vulnerable to cognitive illusions that can
produce poor judgments); Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 84, at 99-101
("Courts identify cognitive illusions that might affect juries and adapt to them, but fail
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motivations means that honest and well-intentioned judges who
subjectively believe that they are and will remain impartial may
nevertheless harbor biases.88
B. Implementing the Recusal Standard
The recusal standards in Canada, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and South Africa unduly emphasize the objective
nature of their judicial recusal standards without adequate
attention to appearances.89 In the United States, the need for
judges to preserve the appearance of impartiality has
traditionally been a cornerstone of the ABA Model Code ofJudicial
Conduct 0 and appears nearly universally in state and federal

to identify cognitive illusions that affect judges and fall prey to them.... [R]esearch
indicates that judges, like everyone else, are susceptible to illusions ofjudgment."). See
JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 571, 595-602 (1998) (discussing hindsight bias and its effects on the judiciary).
88. See LESLIE W. ABRAMSON,JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT xi (2d ed. 1992) ("[I]nstances of judicial preconception
often are innocent in intent. Most judges genuinely believe that, despite their
connections to a lawsuit, they can put aside their bias or interest, and decide the suit
justly. What this ignores, unfortunately, is that partiality is more likely to affect the
unconscious thought processes of a judge, with the result that he or she has little
conscious knowledge of being swayed by improper influences. Furthermore, even if a
judge were able to put aside bias and self-interest in a particular case, the appearance
of impropriety remains, and is itself a serious problem that casts disrepute upon the
judiciary."); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 70, at 277 (noting that "even honest judges
... may be swayed by unacknowledged motives"); Nugent, supra note 81, at 3 ("[A]II
judges, as a part of basic human functioning, bring to each decision a package of
personal biases and beliefs that may unconsciously and unintentionally affect the
decisionmaking process."); W. Bradley Wendel, The Behavioral Psychology of Judicial
Corruption: A Response to judge Irin and Daniel Real 42 McGEORGE L. REV. 35, 41
(2010) (noting that "a judge with the best of intentions may believe herself to be
making her best efforts to put aside feelings of partiality or loyalty, but may be unable
to override the influence of unconscious biases").
89. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2012) ("A judge
shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."); id. R. 1.2
("A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety."). See Raymond J. McKoski, judicial Discipline and
the Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public Sees is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1914, 1920-36 (2010) (tracing the development of the appearance of impropriety
standard in the United States).
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regulations.9 ' Unfortunately, implementing the recusal standard
has fallen short. As Professor Stempel observed, rather than
taking pains to inspire public confidence in the judiciary, "the
implicit governing notion" with respect to recusal appears to be
that "the judge will only recuse if she is convinced that nearly
every sane person would hold a reasonable question regarding
the judge's impartiality.""9 2 In addition to inconsistencies in
applying the standard,93 there have been other attempts to
undermine the appearance of impropriety standard. For
example, during the most recent revision of the Model Code of
judicial Conduct, opponents challenged the appearance of
impropriety standard as too vague to be workable.94 Similarly,
Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court has criticized the

91. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canons 2, 3, reprinted in

Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 175 F.R.D. 363, 365-73 (1998); Marie McManus
Degnan, No Actual Bias Needed: The Intersection of Due Process and Statutory Recusal 83
TEMP. L. REV. 225, 227 (2010) ("All fifty states have adopted the American Bar

Association's Model Code ofJudicial Conduct ... in substantial part.").
92. Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered judicial DisqualficationAnd a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REv. LITIG. 733, 739 (2011); see id. at
737-38 ("[A] broader concept of what constitutes a 'reasonable question as to
impartiality' is one that does not implicitly seek an unattainable consensus but instead
recognizes that the health of the judicial system is threatened whenever a substantial
portion of the public harbors significant, nonfrivolous concern over the neutrality of a
judge who insists on continuing to preside over a matter.").
93. See infra note 98.
94. See Letter from Ronald C. Minkoff, Sec'y, Ass'n of Prof'l Responsibility
Lawyers, to ABAJoint Comm'n to Evaluate the Model Code ofJudicial Conduct (June
30, 2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
judicialethics/resources/comm rules_minkoff_063004.authcheckdam.pdf (calling for
abolition of the appearance of impropriety standard); Memorandum from Charles E.
McCallum, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, to Mark I.
Harrison, Chair, ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(April 12, 2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/judicialethics/resources/comm-rulesabaethics_committee_41205_ddt.aut
hcheckdam.pdf; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety,
and the Proposed New ABA judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1343-44 (2006)
(stating that "the ABA should not adopt its proposed Rule 1.02, which provides: 'A
judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.'. . . The ABA should
replace the vague 'appearances' rule with specific restrictions.") (emphasis added). But
see Moore, Appearance of Impropriety, supra note 3, at 299 (rejecting a list of specific
restrictions because "there are many ways in which a judge's conduct can create the
appearance of impropriety, and there is no way that specific rules can capture all these
situations").
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appearance standard as too broad, and instead seemed only
concerned with actual demonstrable bias.95
Striking the best balance is difficult. A truly objective
standard preserves the judiciary from abusive challenges, but at
the expense of undervaluing the perspective of the challenger.
In our view, such a truly objective standard fails to consider
appearances of impartiality. The objective standard should stand
apart from both the "reasonable judge" and the "tainted
litigant."
"Appearance" means "the way things seem to be."96
Accordingly, an appearance of impropriety can exist due to the
way things seem to be, regardless of the ultimate factual
accuracy of that perception.97 There is a serious risk that the
judiciary is subjectivizing the objective standard: judicial
explanations of the recusal standard very nearly require that the
"reasonable person" is actually a reasonable judge.98
95. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004)
(Scalia, J. mem.) (stating that whether a judge's impartiality can reasonably be
questioned is to be made in light of the facts as they existed, and not as they were
reported); id at 916 ("Why would [the need for recusal] follow from my being in a
sizable group of persons, in a hunting camp with the Vice President, where I never
hunted with him in the same blind or had other opportunity for private
conversation?"); id at 924 ("It is well established that the recusal inquiry must be
'made from the perspective of a reasonableobserver who is informed of all the surrounding
facts and circumstances.'") (quoting Microsoft Corp v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302
(2000)). See also Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657,
658-60 (2005) (discussing the Cheney case); Geyh, supra note 77, at 710 (noting that
justice Scalia "categorically dismissed public expression [questioning his impartiality in
the Cheney case]of views to the contrary as unreasonable and ill-informed"). In this
respect, Justice Scalia's approach to recusal might be viewed as consistent with
Professor Geyh's description of the first of four regimes in the history of judicial
disqualification. This first regime, in contrast with the approach today, was an approach
"characterized by an almost ironclad presumption of impartiality." Id. at 675.
96. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 68 (4th ed. 2002) (emphasis
added).
97. See ABA MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (2012) ("Conduct

that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of ajudge undermines public confidence in the judiciary.").
98. Some might argue that this line has already been crossed. Tumey v. Ohio
defined the requisite test as whether the situation "would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)
(emphasis added). Two subsequent cases, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972), quoted the same language
from the Tumey decision. However, in Aetna Lsfe Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822
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These issues of substance and procedure highlight serious
problems with the current approach to judicial recusal.
Appearances-the way things seem to be-include a perception
component, as the Caperton majority recognized.99 Requiring
disqualification when the judge's impartiality "might reasonably
be questioned" 00 similarly imports public opinion through its
use of a reasonableness standard. If, in applying the appearance
of impropriety standard, the judge disregards public perception,
the standard is thereby impermissibly converted to one
requiring actual bias, as illustrated by Justice Benjamin's
opinion.10
III. PROPOSALS FORJUDICIAL RECUSAL WORLDWIDE
Part III offers a three-step approach to improving judicial
recusal practices worldwide. We recommend: (1) in
implementing the recusal standard, that judges honor
appearances of impropriety as well as actual bias; (2) instituting
(1986), the Court, although again citing to Tumey, abbreviated the quotation to "the
average . ... judge." The modified Tumey quote appeared again in Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 n.12 (1988). In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the majority cited to the standard twice-once using the full
Tumey quotation, and later using the abbreviated "average judge" version. Caperton,556
U.S. at 878, 879. Chief Justice Roberts's Caperton dissent questioned whether the
applicable standard was that of "a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a
reasonable judge." IL at 896 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Not surprisingly, the lower
court decisions reflect similar inconsistencies. Compare United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d
33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that the applicable standard is "whether the charge of
lack of impartiality is grounded on facts that would create a reasonable doubt
concerning the judge's impartiality, not in the mind of the judge himself or even
necessarily in the mind of the [movant], but rather in the mind of the reasonable
man"), with Deluca v. Long Island, 862 F.2d 427, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1988) (focusing on
whether an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of the facts underlying the
grounds on which recusal is sought, would entertain significant doubt that justice
would be done absent recusal); see also United States v. Wade, 931 F.2d 300, 304 (5th
Cir. 1991) (relying on whether a reasonable person, knowing relevant facts, would
expect that "a justice, judge, or magistrate knew of circumstances creating an
appearance of partiality"). See generally FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 14 (noting that
"the modern American case precedents that deal with judicial disqualification issues
are replete with inconsistencies").
99. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884 (concluding that there was a serious risk of bias
"based on objective and reasonable perceptions").
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); Am. BAR Ass'N, MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11(A) (2012).
101. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Benjamin's
rejection of appearances as a basis for recusal).
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peremptory challenge procedures, and (3) using alternative or
additional decision makers in reviewing disqualification
motions. We describe each of these recommendations in turn.
First, judges should honor the appearance of impropriety
standard, which already forms the basis for judicial recusal in
the applicable judicial rules. To the extent that judges have
attempted to evade the appearances standard by requiring
actual bias, or by considering only the perceptions of those who
are "fully informed," such attempts fail to follow the applicable
law. Instead, judges should recuse themselves whenever a
reasonable observer might question the judge's impartiality.
Second, with respect to peremptory challenges, an oftarticulated objection is the fear of potential judge shopping,
where the moving party has no legitimate fear of judicial bias,
but instead is attempting to increase the odds of obtaining a
more favorable judge."1 2 Certainly nearly any procedure can be
misused or abused. However, if each side is given only one
peremptory challenge, there are serious limits upon its potential
misuse. 0 Our third recommendation is to establish an
alternative to the universal practice in common law countries of
filing disqualification motions with the challenged judge.
Several alternative procedures are possible. One alternative that
a number of states already employ involves the discretionary
transfer of a disqualification motion to another judge in the
same system. 04 Another alternative would permit parties to

102. See Bassett, Judicial Disqualfication, supra note 74, at 1254 ("The most
frequent objection to previous proposals involving peremptory challenges to federal
judges has involved the fear of gamesmanship or judge-shopping."); JAMES SAMPLE ET
AL.,

FAIR

COURTS:

SETTING

RECUsAL

STANDARDS

5

(2008),

available

at

http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/Brennancenterrecusalreport.pdf (noting that "the
potential for gamesmanship is a concern" with judicial peremptory challenges); see also
FLAMM, supra note 2, § 3.5.2, at 65 ("Of the many varieties of 'abuse' to which
peremptory disqualification provisions are susceptible, 'judge-shopping' has widely
been recognized to be the most common.").
103. Indeed, approximately one-third of the state judiciaries, including California
and Texas, employ a peremptory disqualification procedure. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra
note 102, at 5 (noting that "[a]bout a third of the states already permit counsel to
strike one judge per proceeding"); see also FLAMM, supra note 2, ch. 27, at 768-839
(detailing the peremptory challenge procedures of each state).
104. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.059 (West 1995); UTAH R. CIV. P. 63(b),
construed in Anderson v. Anderson, 368 P.2d 264, 265 (Utah 1962); People v. Mercado,
614 N.E.2d 284, 287-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Thompson, 544 So. 2d 421, 428
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submit disqualification motions to the court clerk, who would
forward the motion to the challenged judge for initial review. If
the challenged judge agreed that recusal was appropriate and
recused herself from the case, no further action would be
necessary. If, however, the challenged judge declined to recuse,
the clerk would forward the motion to another judge within that
jurisdiction for review. 05
We recognize that no change in the rules for
disqualification ofjudges, nor any new set of processes, can ever
fully reform this area beset, as it is, with human responses
including both failures of perception and understandable
protective impulses. A "cure" is not possible. Instead, we suggest
one structural response that, over time, may reorient the
judiciary, as well as two modest procedural changes that will
help to mitigate the natural human responses at play in judicial
disqualification. In time, an emphasis on the appearance of
impropriety will remove the subjective element from recusal.
Judges will come to recognize that they are not being personally
challenged-it is the appearance that matters. The procedural
changes are only palliative. They make mechanical changes that
remove the judge as the focus of the inquiry and as the evaluator
of her own biases. A number of states, such as California, have
functioned smoothly with a peremptory challenge procedure at
the trial court level, with the process becoming an accepted
procedure by both the bench and bar. A judiciary sensitive to
conflict of interest concerns can easily understand having
disqualification motions decided by other judges.
CONCLUSION
Under current practices and procedures in common law
jurisdictions worldwide, circumstances involving potential
appearances of impropriety have spawned inconsistencies in
judicial recusal. The problem is not with the underlying ideal,
but with the failure to implement this ideal. This failure is
perhaps not surprising: law is the creature of, and must be
(La. Ct. App. 1989); City of Columbus v. Bonner, 440 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ohio Ct. App.
1981).
105. We have offered this proposal previously. See Bassett & Perschbacher, supra
note 77, at 213.

162 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:136

implemented by, human actors. Whether those actors are
lawyers, lay participants, or judges, individuals are poor judges of
their own biases and of their ability to set aside those biases.
However, more than the human condition itself, the legal
norms used to resolve questions of judicial disqualification have
structural flaws that, combined with the human actors in charge
of carrying them out, make them unlikely to achieve their
purported goals. The underlying purpose ofjudicial recusal is to
instill public confidence in the judiciary. If judges base their
recusal rulings either upon their personal, non-public
knowledge of the underlying circumstances or upon their
personal belief in their own impartiality, the standard becomes a
subjective one that does little to further recusal's underlying
purpose.
In this Article, we identified two problems with judicial
recusal, one involving the decision-maker and the other
involving the applicable standard. To address the problem with
the decision maker, we proposed instituting a peremptory
challenge procedure, using decision makers other than the
challenged judge. To address the problem with the recusal
standard, we proposed implementing the existing appearance of
impropriety whenever a reasonable observer might question the
judge's impartiality, with judicial acknowledgement that an
appearances standard is necessarily based on perceptions rather
than full and complete information.

